Introduction
In representing Samoa as part of the Preparatory Commission for the Inter national Criminal Court in reference to the crime of aggression, Roger Clark took an expansive view of the potential scope of liability and submitted a pro posal that 'raised the question whether there should be liability under the Rome Statute for direct and public incitement to aggression.'1 The proposal was tabled and incitement was not ultimately incorporated into the aggression amendments adopted at the Kampala Review Session in 2010. With respect to such 'warcouncil' aggression speech, the utility of any corol lary incitement provision is questionable-those who would act-the con trollers of the government/military apparatus-need no exhorting as they monopolize agency. Related to this, and in contrast to the other icc core crimes, warcouncil related aggression conduct (necessarily entailing internal government discus sions) is inextricably linked with speech. So it may appear somewhat redundant or superfluous to criminalize speech that would trigger other such speech. As a result, in order to capture the inchoate potential of the offense, 'attempt to commit aggression' would seem to criminalize effectively essayed but unreal ized projects of illegitimate stateinitiated armed violence against other states. Moreover, unlike the other core crimes, any theoretical 'inciting' speech con nected to warcouncil aggression conduct does not as directly entail dehu manization or marginalization of an outgroup being targeted for violence or inhumane treatment. Thus, the unique power of speech in relation to mass atrocity-its capacity to demean and objectify the other-is not as directly implicated with regard to warcouncil aggression.
But the other variety of aggressionrelated discourse that a theoretical incitement crime implicates, 'warmongering,' is quite different. It entails gov ernment leaders conditioning their citizens to support illegal war campaigns through speeches and mass media. It is not always a sine qua non for perpetrat ing the crime of aggression (as warcouncil conduct is) but, in cases of contro versial war campaigns, it is sometimes needed to assure sufficient troop morale and civilian cooperation. And, it empirically entails speech dehumanizing the enemy population. Further, it has historically been recognized as an offense. So, criminalizing it via incitement makes more sense and, indeed, fills in important gaps within the aggression offense's definitional and operational framework. Thus, the crime of direct and public incitement to commit aggres sion, the public element implicitly excluding 'warcouncil' communication, is certainly viable.
